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SUSTAINING A JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE
Sustaining a Jurisdictional Quagmire(?):
Analysis and Assessment of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction in the Third
Circuit
The United States ofAmerica v. Donovan'
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Donovan, the Third Circuit addressed the
appropriate legal standard for determining whether the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers ("Corps") has jurisdiction over wetland areas under the Clean
Water Act2 ("CWA").3 The case is significant in that it is the first Third
Circuit opinion to address that question in the wake of Rapanos v. United
States,4 wherein a plurality Supreme Court opinion established two
different and competing legal standards. The practical implications of the
decision involve the tension between building development and
environmental protection, which gives the case particular significance vis-
A-vis issues of sustainability. Moreover, the Third Circuit's analysis and
ultimate holding has noteworthy implications for the interpretation of
plurality Supreme Court opinions.
This note begins by setting forth the facts and events that led to the
Third Circuit's review of Donovan. The second section then reviews the
pertinent laws, court opinions, and historical events that shaped the Third
Circuit's analysis and holding in the case. Following that is an
examination of the Donovan opinion detailing the Third Circuit's legal
analysis and holdings. The final section is a critical discussion of and
commentary on Donovan, which examines and assesses the implications
for sustainable land use practices, the strengths and weaknesses of the
opinion, and the possible consequences of the legal analysis used to reach
1661 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011).
228 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)-(b)(3) (2006).
3 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 176.
4 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
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the holding. Ultimately, the conclusion drawn is that Donovan was a
missed opportunity because it failed to produce a legal standard faithful to
the express intent of the Supreme Court and conducive to advancing
sustainable land use practices.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The controversy in United States v. Donovan arose when the
United States brought an enforcement action against David H. Donovan
alleging he violated the CWA by adding fill material to wetlands on his
property in Delaware.5 The enforcement action sought court-ordered
removal of the fill material and assessment of a fine.6
Donovan owned four acres of land in a tidal area near the
Delaware Bay.7 Following inspection of the land in 1987, the Corps
classified Donovan's property as wetlands subject to regulation under the
CWA. Because the inspection revealed Donovan had filled three-fourths
of an acre of his property, the Corps informed Donovan that a permit
would be required to fill more than a total of one acre of the property.
Subsequent inspection in 1993 revealed additional filling, in excess of one
acre, for which Donovan had not obtained the requisite Corps permit.10
The Corps sent Donovan a cease and desist notice, ordering removal of
over three-fourths of an acre of fill material." Donovan refused, insisting
the Corps had no authority to regulate his use of the land.12 The United
States then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Donovan, 661 F.3d at 176.






12 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 176 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Delaware alleging violations of the CWA.13 Ultimately, a final judgment
was entered against Donovan.14
Donovan appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals; however,
the Circuit Court remanded the case to the district court for further
development of the record regarding the issue of whether the Corps had
jurisdiction over Donovan's land.'5 The case was assigned to a Magistrate
Judge for pretrial matters, at which time Donovan moved for judgment on
the pleadings and the Government sought summary judgment.16 In1
support of its motion, the Government submitted two expert opinions.' 7
Both opinions indicated the channels on Donovan's land were permanent
with a continuous surface connection to a navigable body of water, and the
water from Donovan's land had a significant impact on down stream
waters. 8 In support of his motion, Donovan submitted no expert
evidence, but did submit an affidavit indicating that, in the absence of rain,
the channels on his property stayed completely dry.19 Giving no credit to
Donovan's affidavit, the Magistrate recommended the District Court of
Delaware grant summary judgment for the Government and deny
Donovan's motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2 0 These
recommendations were based on the Magistrate's analysis of the expert
reports, which, the Magistrate concluded, offered sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Donovan's wetlands satisfied both tests for CWA
jurisdiction articulated by the Supreme Court in Rapanos v. United
StateS21 22
13 d. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006)).14 Id. The district court ordered Donovan to remove of .771 acres of fill and imposed a
fine of $250,000. Id.
1s Id. at 176-77. The order for remand was granted based on a motion filed by the United
States. Id.
" Id. at 177.
17 id
18 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2011).
20 d
21 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
22 Donovan. 661 F.3d at 177.
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Donovan objected to the Magistrate's recommendations, arguing
the Magistrate had misapplied the standard for summary judgment.
Agreeing with the Magistrate and rejecting Donovan's objection, the
district court said the correct standard for summary judgment had been
applied and held CWA jurisdiction exists when either of the tests
articulated by the Supreme Court in Rapanos is satisfied.24 Furthermore,
the district court found the Government's expert reports provided enough
evidence to satisfy both Rapanos tests, and deemed Donovan's affidavit,
without more, insufficient evidence to counter the prima facie case
established by the reports, wherefore the district court ruled that Donovan
had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact.2 5 Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment
for the Government and denied Donovan's motion for judgment on the
pleadings.26 Donovan appealed to the Third Circuit arguing the district
court had applied incorrect legal standards both for summary judgment
and for the determination of whether a wetland area is subject to
regulation under the CWA.27
On appeal, the Third Circuit issued an opinion containing two
holdings. First, the court held when wetlands fulfill either the Kennedy or
the plurality test articulated in Rapanos, federal jurisdiction to regulate
those wetlands exists pursuant to the CWA.28 Further, when both
Rapanos tests have been satisfied, summary judgment granting
jurisdiction under the CWA is appropriate unless countervailing evidence
23 Id. at 177-78.
24 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2011). The Rapanos
plurality's test grants Corps jurisdiction "if the wetlands have a continuous surface
connection with waters of the 'United States."' Id. at 184. Justice Kennedy's test grants
Corps jurisdiction if the wetlands have a "substantial nexus" with waters of the United
States. Id. These two tests are examined in greater detail in the Legal Background
section infra.
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is provided which raises genuine questions of material fact under both
tests.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act & Corresponding Regulations
A primary goal of the CWA 30 is to stop the discharge of pollutants
into "navigable waters."3 Accordingly, the CWA makes the "discharge
of any pollutant by any person" into navigable waters illegal.32 Under the
CWA, the term pollutant includes "rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial ...
waste discharged into water" and navigable waters are defined as "the
waters of the United States." 33 Far from unambiguous, the term
"navigable waters" and its corresponding definitional text have long been
subject to regulatory interpretation by the Corps. 34 The Corps'
interpretation of "waters of the United States" has not been limited to
those navigable in fact waters traditionally subject to regulation by
Congress under the commerce clause.35 In fact, as defined and interpreted
by the Corps, the phrase "waters of the United States" embraces an
29 Id. at 186-88.
'o 28 U.S.C. § 1251 et. seq. (2006).
3 Id. at § 1251(a)(1).
32 Id. at § 1311(a).
31Id. at § 1362(6-7).
34 Anthony Cash, Comment, U.S. v. Bailey: An Expansion ofFederal Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction, 3 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 121, 122 (2011); see also
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723-24 (2006) (plurality opinion) (discussing the
historical development of the case law expanding the administrative interpretation of
waters of the United States).
3s Cash, supra note 34, at 122. Waters "are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). For a detailed discussion of
the test for and definition of water navigability see generally William W. Sapp et al., The
Float A Boat Test: How to Use It to Advantage in This Post-Rapanos World, 38 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10439, 10444 (2008).
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expansive variety of waters including traditional navigable-in-fact waters
and their tributaries as well as wetlands adjacent either of the foregoing.36
This expansive interpretation of waters of the United States first received
review and consideration by the Supreme Court in 1985.37
B. Judicial Review of Corps Interpretation
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Court
reviewed whether the Corps' interpretation of waters subject to regulation
under the CWA was overly broad insomuch as it included wetlands
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters.3 8 Ultimately, the Court held
inclusion of wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters under the
interpretation of waters of the United States was reasonable.39 This
conclusion stemmed from the Court's recognition that identifying where
water ends and dry land begins is difficult as it may not be an abrupt
transition, wherefore agency determinations on the issue deserve
considerable deference from the courts.40 It also hinged on the fact that
the wetlands in question abutted directly upon a navigable-in-fact
waterway and had a significant nexus with that navigable-in-fact
waterway.4' Following the holding in Riverside, "the Corps adopted
increasingly broad interpretations of its own regulations under the" CWA
and eventually their interpretation of navigable waters subject to CWA
jurisdiction came to include "virtually any land feature over which
rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark."4 2 The validity of
this expansive interpretation came under scrutiny by the Supreme Court in
3633 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7) (2011).
n See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
" Id. at 13 1.
39 Id. at 139.
40 Id. at 132; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 740-41 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the holding in Riverside).
41 Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135.
42 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion).
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2001 when it reviewed Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern Cook County v.
Army Corps of Engineers43 ("SWANCC").
In SWANCC, the Court reviewed whether the Corps' interpretation
of "waters of the United States" was overbroad insomuch as it included an
abandoned and isolated gravel pit that was subject to seasonal flooding.44
The Corps asserted its jurisdiction was proper under the CWA because the
pit had developed into a habitat for a variety of migratory birds that cross
state lines, making it subject to regulation by Congress under the
Commerce Clause.45 Noting its decision in Riverside was founded on the
"significant nexus" that existed between the wetlands and the abutting
body of navigable water, the Court rejected the Corps' assertions that the
agency's jurisdiction included ponds "not adjacent to open water."4 6
Giving effect to the word "navigable," the Court held the Corps'
interpretation of "water of the United States" exceeded the statutory
authority to the extent it included isolated bodies of water not adjacent to
navigable bodies of water. 47
The Court's holding in SWANCC not only limited federal
environmental regulatory authority, but also continued a more general
trend of Supreme Court decisions limiting federal authority to regulate
under the auspices of the Commerce Clause.4 8 More specifically, the
Court confirmed an emerging commitment to the principles of federalism
and state's rights, which the decision in SWANCC demonstrated by
constricting the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA.4 9 Although the
43 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
[hereinafter SWANCC].
4Id. at 163-67.
45 Id. at 164-65; see also FINAL RULE FOR REGULATORY PROGRAMS OF THE CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, 51 FED. REG. 41217, (Nov. 13, 1986) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328.3)
("Migratory Bird Rule").
46 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
4 7 Id. at 171-72, 174.
48 See Jamie Y. Tanabe, Comment, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal
Environmental Law Survive in the Post- SWANCC Epoch of "New Federalism"?, 31
ENVTL. L. 1051, 1070-73 (2001).
49 Id. at 1083.
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Supreme Court may have intended the SWANCC decision to limit the
Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA, that did not happen.50
Following the decision in SWANCC, the Corps contemplated
changing its regulatory interpretation of the CWA; however, to the
displeasure of the Court, changes were never made.5 1 Construing the
SWANCC decision narrowly, and arguing SWANCC had no effect on the
Court's expansive and deferential holding in Riverside, the Corps
continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters and
52their tributary systems, as well as waters and wetlands adjacent thereto.
This practice was encouraged and advanced by the lower courts through
broad interpretation of the words "tributaries" and "adjacent," thus further
undermining any limit on federal authority the Supreme Court may have
intended by its holding in SWANCC.53 Unhappy with what it viewed as
"implausible" 54 and even "absurd"'55 judicial and administrative
interpretations of the CWA, which had the effect of granting the Corps
jurisdiction over "ephemeral channels and drains," the Supreme Court
took up the issue again in 2006.56
50 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726 (2006) (plurality opinion).
s' Id. at 726 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(expressing regret that the Corps did not respond differently to the SWANCC decision).
52 Id. at 726 (plurality opinion) (quoting ADVANCED NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE MAKING
ON THE CLEAN WATER ACT REGULATORY DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE U.S., 68 FED.
REG. 1991-01 (Jan. 10, 2003) (not codified in C.F.R.) (appendix A, Joint Memorandum)).
" Id. at 726-28 (plurality opinion).
54 Id. at 727 (plurality opinion). "[A]nd (most implausibly of all) the washes and arroyos
of an arid development site, located in the middle of the desert, through which water
courses ... during periods of heavy rain." Id.
5Id. at 727 n.2 (plurality opinion). "[T]he absurdity of finding the desert filled with
waters." Id.
56 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 726 (2006).
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C. The Rapanos Decision and Tests
In Rapanos v. United States,57 the Supreme Court considered again
whether the Corps' interpretation of "navigable waters" and "waters of the
United States" exceeded the statutory authority granted by the CWA."
However, a divided Court issued a 4 - 1 - 4 decision containing multiple
legal standards, none of them controlling. 59 Justice Scalia wrote the
plurality opinion and focused on statutory interpretation through a
common sense understanding based on the plain meaning of the text.60
Using those methods, the plurality articulated a standard under which:
[E]stablishing that wetlands . . . sites are covered by the
[CWA] requires two findings: first, that the adjacent
channel contains a "wate[r] of the United States," (i.e., a
relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional
interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland
has a continuous surface connection with that water,
making it difficult to determine where the "water" ends and
the "wetland" begins.61
" 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion). Discussion of the Rapanos decision here is
limited to the tests articulated in the Kennedy and plurality opinions and to the language
in the dissent addressing those two tests. For more on the Rapanos decision see, e.g.
Brian Elwood, Note, Rapanos v. United States: The Supreme Court's Failed Attempt to
Interpret Wetland Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 1343
(2007) and Bren Mollerup, Note, Rapanos v. United States: "Waters of the United
States" Under the Clean Water Act, 12 DRAKE J. AGRic. L. 521 (2007).
58 See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (plurality opinion).
5 Mollerup, supra note 57, at 527.
60 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732-34 (plurality opinion) (use of Websters dictionary to provide
a definition of statutory text and reference to a common sense understanding of terms);
see also Brandon C. Smith, Note, Jurisdictional Donnybrook Deciphering Wetlands
Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 337, 354 (2007) (discussing Justice
Scalia's use of the Webster's Dictionary to conduct statutory interpretation).
61 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (plurality opinion).
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Finding no support for the plurality's standard in the text of the
CWA or in prior Supreme Court decisions interpreting the CWA, Justice
Kennedy concurred only in the judgment, filing a separate opinion.62 In
Justice Kennedy's view, the proper test for determining CWA jurisdiction
was a significant nexus standard previously articulated by the Court in
Riverside and SWANCC. 63 Synthesizing aspects of those two cases,
Justice Kennedy provided for a test under which: "wetlands possess the
requisite nexus, and thus come within [CWA jurisdiction as] 'navigable
waters,' if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
'navigable'." 64 Thus, the Rapanos decision produced two possible
standards for determining whether wetlands constitute "waters of the
United States" subject to Corps regulation under the CWA.65
While neither legal standard commanded a majority of votes, thejudgment of the Court was clear, as was its intent; the intent of both the
plurality and of Justice Kennedy was to narrow the circumstances under
which the Corps could assert jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA.
For the plurality, the significant factors underlying that intent were the
considerable delays and tremendous costs involved with the federal
permitting process; the plurality felt a narrower standard would reduce
those costs and delays.6 7 However, the fact that both tests failed to secure
68a majority vote did not go unnoticed by the dissenting justices.
62 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 768 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in thejudgment); see Mollerup, supra note 57, at 529.
63Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
4Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
65 Gregory H. Morrison, Comment, A Nexus of Confusion: Why the Agencies Responsible
for Clean Water Act Enforcement Should Promulgate A New Set of Rules Governing the
Act's Jurisdiction, 42 MCGEORGE L. REv. 397, 402 (2011).
6 Cash, supra note 34, at 128.
67 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion).
68 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing how the lower courts should apply the two different legal standards provided
by the plurality and Justice Kennedy).
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Justice Stevens wrote for the four justices who dissented in
Rapanos on a variety of grounds, but he relied primarily on the doctrine of
judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations. 69 In closing the
opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court's split opinion
produced two different standards for application by the lower courts on
remand. 70 However, Justice Stevens opined that because all four
dissenting justices would have upheld Corps jurisdiction under either the
Kennedy or plurality test, on remand, the lower courts should uphold
Corps jurisdiction if the requirements of either test were fulfilled.7 In
fact, the dissent stated it would uphold Corps jurisdiction in all future
cases in which either of the two Rapanos tests is satisfied.72 Thus, the
dissenters opined, "in . .. future cases the United States may elect to prove
[CWA] jurisdiction under either test." 73
D. Fallout in the Wake ofRapanos
In the wake of Rapanos, the circuits have struggled to determine
which test is the controlling legal standard for determining Corps
jurisdiction over wetlands.74 Indeed, a split has emerged among those
circuits having directly addressed the issue. First to address the Corps'
jurisdiction in the wake of Rapanos was the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Gerke Excavating Inc.76 In an effort to discern which of
Rapanos's tests was controlling, the Seventh Circuit looked to Marks v.
' Id. at 787-810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a more comprehensive discussion of
Justice Stevens' legal analysis in Rapanos see Smith, supra note 60, at 373-380; see also
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 476 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)
(principles of agency deference).
70 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1Id. at 810 n.14. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Morrison, supra note 65, at 407.
7 Id. at 407-408.
76 United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
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United States,77 where the Supreme Court stated the controlling ojinion in
a plurality decision is the one decided on the narrowest grounds.7 The
Seventh Circuit felt language in the plurality's opinion established the
Kennedy test as the narrower.7 9 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit noted:
[A]ny conclusion that Justice Kennedy reaches in favor of
federal authority over wetlands in a future case will
command the support of five Justices (himself plus the four
dissenters), and in most cases in which he concludes that
there is no federal authority he will command five votes
(himself plus the four Justices in the Rapanos plurality), the
exception being a case in which he would vote against
federal authority only to be outvoted 8-to-i because there
was a slight surface hydrological connection.8 0
Thus, in the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the Kennedy test represented the
lowest common denominator making it the controlling legal standard.
Citing the Seventh Circuit's extensive analysis with approval, the Ninth
Circuit joined its sister circuit, holding that the Kennedy test is the
controlling standard under Rapanos.8 F
In United States v. Robison,82 the Eleventh Circuit refused to
disregard the precepts articulated by the Supreme Court in Marks.83 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit also found the Kennedy test to be the narrowest of the
Rapanos standards because it was less far reaching than the plurality test
insomuch as it was the least restrictive of Corps jurisdiction under the
84CWA. Consequently, the Eleventh joined the Ninth and Seventh
7 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
78 Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d at 724.
7 Id.
8 0 d. at 725.
81 See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir.
2007).
82 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).8 1 d. at 1221.
' Id. at 1221-22.
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Circuits in concluding that, under Rapanos, the controlling legal standard
is the Kennedy test.8 5
The First and Eighth Circuits declined to follow their sister
circuits.86 Rather, these two circuits felt Marks failed to provide a
workable solution because, in their opinion, neither Rapanos test was
decided on narrower grounds.87 The First Circuit noted, however, that if
followed, Justice Stevens' instruction from the dissent "ensures that lower
courts will find jurisdiction in all cases where a majority of the [Supreme]
Court would support such a finding," since doing so resulted in majority
combinations of the various judges from the dissent, plurality, and
concurrence.8 8 The First Circuit found particular credence in combining
votes from the various opinions to form a Supreme Court majority,
because that practice had been endorsed in several previous Supreme
Court opinions. 89 Consideration of the opinions from these Circuit Courts,
and the reasoning contained in their opinions, formed the basis of the
Third Circuit's review when United States v. Donovan came before it on
appeal.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Controlling Legal Standard From Rapanos
On appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Donovan argued
the district court committed reversible error by applying both Rapanos
85 id
86 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2011).
87 United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 571
F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009).8 8 Johnson, 476 F.3d at 64.
8 9 Id. at 65. "Since Marks, several members of the Court have indicated that whenever a
decision is fragmented such that no single opinion has the support of five Justices, lower
courts should examine the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions to extract the
principles that a majority has embraced." Id. (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
685 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring)).
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tests.90 Donovan asserted that, as a plurality decision, Rapanos provided
no governing standard, wherefore the district court should have applied
pre-Rapanos standards from within the Third Circuit.9' While
acknowledging circuit courts were split over the correct interpretation of
Rapanos, the Third Circuit disagreed with Donovan, pointing out that no
circuit had adopted his position.92 The court then discussed the reasoning
and rationale underlying decisions in the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits,
which had held the Kennedy test was controlling.93 Next, the Third
Circuit analyzed decisions from the First and Eighth Circuits, which had
held both of the Rapanos tests were valid and controlling legal standards.94
Ultimately, the panel agreed with the First and Eighth circuit for a
multitude of reasons. 95
To begin, the Third Circuit explained that because neither the
Kennedy test nor the plurality test relied on narrower grounds, traditional
methods for determining which was the controlling opinion were
inapplicable. 96 The court explained that, when analyzing a plurality
opinion of the Supreme Court, its goal is to identify a legal standard that
produces results "with which a majority of the Supreme Court Justices ...
would agree."97 In doing so, the Third Circuit explained its practice is to
see whether the votes of dissenting Justices can be combined with votes
from the lurality or concurring opinions to form a majority on the issue in
question. The panel defended this methodology by pointing to decisions
9 0 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 180.
91 Id.
92 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2011).
93 1d. at 180-81 (citing United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (1Ith Cir.2007)).
9 4 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 181-182 (citing United States v. Johnson, 476 F.3d 56, 62-64
(1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009)).
95 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182.96 d "The traditional standard for analyzing plurality opinions was established by the
supreme court in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)." Id. at 181.9 7 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
947 F.2d 682, 693 (3rd Cir. 1991), modfiedon other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
98 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 2011)).
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in which the Supreme Court itself had done the same. 99 Turning to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Rapanos, the Third Circuit focused on
language in Justice Stevens' dissent. 00
The court quoted extensively from the dissent, which would have
upheld the Corps's jurisdiction in a much broader range of cases including
"all ... cases in which either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is
satisfied."o'0 In fact, the Third Circuit felt that by stating, "in these and
future cases the United States may elect to prove jurisdiction under either
test," the dissent provided a clear instruction which eliminated any
confusion as to the proper legal standard.102 According to the Third
Circuit, this statement provided a mandate for the Courts of Appeals, and
to disregard that mandate would be to ignore the directive of the
dissenters.103 Moreover, the panel pointed out that the position taken by
the dissenters meant any time one of the tests was satisfied a 5-4 or an 8-1
majority in favor of Corps jurisdiction would exist, and when neither test
was satisfied a 5-4 majority against Corps jurisdiction would exist.104
Because it felt both Rapanos tests had received the explicit endorsement
of a majority of Supreme Court Justices, the Third Circuit held Corps
jurisdiction under the CWA exists any time either Rapanos test is
satisfied. 05 Based on this holding, the panel rejected Donovan's assertion
that the district court committed reversible error by applying both Rapanos
tests and moved on to analyze the summary judgment issue. 06
99 Id. (discussing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984)).
" Donovan, 661 F.3d at 183.
101 Id. (quoting Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
102 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 183 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 n.14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
103 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 183.
'0 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 184 (3d Cir. 2011).
106 id
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B. Deciding Summary Judgment
Donovan argued the magistrate and district court judges had
misapplied the summary judgment standard by placing the burden of proof
on him to demonstrate his lands were not subject to CWA jurisdiction.107
The Third Circuit began its de novo review of this issue by establishing
the standard for granting summary judgment. 08 According to the court,
the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of producing
evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial.109 If the moving party succeeds, then the nonmoving party must
adduce "specific facts showing" the existence of "a genuine issue for
trial."lo That showing, the court said, must create "more than a
'metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'""' Having laid out these
standards, the panel began its analysis by determining whether the
evidence provided by the Government was sufficient to carry the initial
burden in relation to the Rapanos tests."12
Based on the scientific findings underlying the Government's
expert reports, the Third Circuit was satisfied that the channels on
Donovan's land fulfilled the requirements of the plurality test because they
connected to navigable-in-fact waters, were relatively permanent, and had
a continuous surface connection to a body of water covered by the
CWA.113 From additional scientific findings contained in the expert
reports, the panel further concluded that Donovan's wetlands satisfied the
Kennedy test because they affected the "chemical, physical, and biological
1071d. at 186 n.9.0 8 Id. at 180 n.5; see FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
109 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 184-85 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
'o United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 184-85 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
" Donovan, 661 F.3d at 184-85 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.)112 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 184-85.
" Id. at 185-86 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723-33 (2006) (plurality
opinion)).
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integrity" of other navigable-in-fact waters.1 14 In light of these findings,
the Third Circuit held the Government had met its initial burden for
summary judgment and turned to analyze whether Donovan had alleged
specific facts substantial enough to create a genuine issue for trial.1 5
The panel noted the only evidence Donovan proffered was his own
affidavit.116 Because the affidavit consisted entirely of assertions designed
to establish that the channels on Donovan's land were not permanent and
did not have a continuous surface connection, the court felt the affidavit
was only intended to prove Donovan's lands did not satisfy the plurality
test.' 17 The appellate court noted, however, that analysis of the plurality
test was unnecessary because the affidavit failed to raise a genuine issue
about whether the Government's evidence satisfied the Kennedy test."'
Donovan's primary argument regarding the Kennedy test was that by
lumping Donovan's wetlands in with over 700 acres of neighboring
wetlands, the Government reports exaggerated the effect of his wetlands
on downstream waters. 1 19
In response, the Third Circuit discussed findings from within the
expert reports that dealt with the chemical, biological, and physical impact
of Donovan's wetlands alone, without any consideration of the
surrounding lands.' 20 In light of those findings, the panel held the factual
evidence in the record "show[ed] Donovan's wetlands alone" satisfied the
Kennedy test without even accounting for the effect of his wetlands when
aggregated with surrounding wetlands.121 In a footnote, the Third Circuit
expressly declined to set out a list of specific factors relevant for finding
jurisdiction under the Kennedy test; the footnote also made clear that the
opinion in no way addressed the portion of the Kennedy test involving
114 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 186 (quoting Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
115 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 186 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87).
116 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 186 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 186-87.
" Id. at 187.
119 Id.
120 d
121 Id. (emphasis in original).
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jurisdiction based on combination with similarly situated lands.122 In
summary, the appellate court felt the factual evidence contained in the
expert reports supported a finding that Donovan's wetlands, standing
alone, fulfilled the requirements for CWA jurisdiction under the Kennedy
test. Consequently, summary judgment was appropriate absent
countervailing evidence tending to create a genuine issue for trial, of
which there was none.1 24
The panel also noted Donovan's assertions that the Government
reports were indeterminate and approximate such that a fact finder might
not be convinced of Corps jurisdiction over his wetlands.125 Dismissing
this line of argument summarily, the Third Circuit pointed out Donovan
had offered no facts to contradict those set forth in the Government's
expert reports.126 Without factual evidence, the court felt Donovan's
second argument relied entirely on the possibility a fact finder would not
be persuaded by the Government's evidence, which the summary
judgment standard does not permit.' 27 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held
granting summary judgment in favor of the Government was proper
because the Government had submitted sufficient factual evidence to
establish CWA jurisdiction under both Rapanos tests, while Donovan had
failed to provide specific factual evidence creating a genuine issue of fact
as to jurisdiction under the Kennedy test.128
In summary, the Third Circuit held both the Kennedy and plurality
tests constitute valid legal standards by which to determine jurisdiction
under the CWA because both tests commanded the support of a majority
of Supreme Court Justices.129 In this case, because the Government had
adduced specific factual evidence that satisfied the requirements for
122 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 187 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011).
123 id
124 d
125 Id. at 187.
"'i.at 188.
127 Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)).
128 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 188 (3d Cir. 2011).
1 d. at 182, 184.
490
SUSTAINING A JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE
jurisdiction under both Rapanos tests,i30 and because Donovan failed to
come forward with evidence tending to create a genuine issue of fact as to
jurisdiction under both tests, the Third Circuit held that granting the
Government's motion for summary judgment was proper.131
V. COMMENT
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in his concurrence,1 32
Rapanos and all of the negative legal ramifications that followed were
avoidable, including the Third Circuit's decision in Donovan. In response
to the displeasure expressed by the Supreme Court in SWANCC,' 33 the
Environmental Protection Agency and Corps began a rule-making
session,1 34 the result of which would have been new regulatory
interpretations of the CWA reflective of the sentiments expressed by the
Court in SWANCC.'s Ultimately, that proposed rule-making process was
scrapped and the Corps instead decided to construe the SWANCC decision
narrowly. 136 This allowed the Corps to continue asserting CWA
jurisdiction in a manner so broad the Supreme Court felt compelled to step
in - again. However, the second time around, the Supreme Court was
unable to accomplish its goal of narrowing the Corps' CWA jurisdiction.
In Rapanos, the Court produced a fractured opinion that failed to
provide a controlling legal standard.137 In this sense, the Supreme Court
shares in the blame for the current state of the law regarding jurisdiction
under the CWA. By issuing a fractured plurality opinion, the Court
destabilized the existing legal standards governing CWA jurisdiction in
each circuit and left the lower courts to make determinations on a case-by-
130 Id. at 185-86.
13 Id. at 188. In light of these holdings, the Third Circuit concluded the opinion by
affirming the decision of the district court. Id. at 189.
132 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 757-58 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
133 See Tanabe, supra note 48, at 1083 (SWANCC decision constricted Corps CWA
jurisdiction).
134 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
135 Id.
3Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
137 Morrison, supra note 65, at 402.
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case basis.' 38 That, in turn, has produced the current circuit split as to
which Rapanos test is the controlling legal standard.139 In short, both the
Corps and the Supreme Court contributed to the creation of uncertainty
and instability regarding jurisdiction under the CWA. The result is a
quagmire, which the circuit courts have been left to slog through as best
they can.140 Examining the Donovan opinion makes the difficulties caused
by this quagmire apparent.
Despite asserting that application of Marks in interpreting the
Rapanos decision would have been inappropriate,141 the Third Circuit's
holding in Donovan produces a result consistent with Marks. Indeed, the
circuit court's approach creates a legal standard which is technically the
narrowest possible grounds provided by the Rapanos opinions; by using
the dissent to justify adoption of both Rapanos tests,142 the Third Circuit
creates a legal standard that is the least restrictive of the Corps'
jurisdictional authority.143 Thus, while the Third Circuit indicated
Rapanos did not lend itself to Marks analysis, the result produced by
Donovan is exactly what Marks requires. However, the technique used to
reach that result is not consistent with Marks, as Marks arguably does not
authorize circuit courts "to consider the positions of those who
dissented." 44
13 8 Id; accord Darren Springer, How States Can Help to Resolve the Rapanos/Carabell
Dilemma, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 85, 90-91, 97 (2007) (discussing how Rapanos has
made deciding whether a wetland is subject to federal protection a case-by-case
determination that is unclear and ambiguous).
Kristen L. Holm-Hansen, "A Stream Would Rise from the Earth, and Water the Whole
Face of the Ground": The Ethical Necessity for Wetlands Protection Post-Rapanos, 26
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 621, 644 (2012)
' Id. at 407-09.
14 0 Id. (describing the Rapanos decision as a "train wreck").
141United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011).
142 Id. at 184.
143 See Cash, supra note 34, at 129 (adoption of either-or approach by Eighth Circuit,
which is the same as that adopted by the Third Circuit here, expands federal jurisdiction,
and thus is the least restrictive option as required by Marks).
144 United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007).
492
SUSTAINING A JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE
While perhaps technically consistent with Marks, the Third
Circuit's method in achieving that consistency is troubling because the
Donovan opinion disregards the express intent of a majority of the
Supreme Court justices voting in Rapanos.14 5 By adopting both Rapanos
standards, Donovan continues to provide the Corps with broad
jurisdictional authority under the CWA while the obvious intent of the
Supreme Court majority in Rapanos was to narrow and restrict that
authority.14 6 In so doing, the Third Circuit seems to have flouted the
intent of a majority of Supreme Court justices, 14 7 and arguably
undermined a basic and fundamental principle of this country's legal
system. That is, the result reached by the Third Circuit creates doubt as to
whether the obvious intent of a majority of Supreme Court justices will be
the controlling legal interpretation.148 This concern was deftly illustrated
by a recent Sixth Circuit decisionl49 in which the panel interpreted
Rapanos's plurality test in a manner that "deviated from the entire
purpose" and intent of the plurality,150 thus defying the Supreme Court.
Moreover, Donovan establishes a precedent under which the legal
community must attempt to discern whether the dissenting justices on the
Supreme Court have exploited the frailties of a plurality opinion to
undermine the intent of those justices commanding a majority of the votes.
The fault, however, cannot be attributed entirely to the circuit
court. Donovan is the result of the Third Circuit's attempt to make a
meadow out of the metaphorical Rapanos marshland. Circuit courts have
a duty and responsibility to clarify and interpret the legal standards
established by the Supreme Court, but it is not surprising that circuit
courts have struggled to provide such guidance when the Supreme Court
failed to provide a controlling legal standard in Rapanos.'5 ' Nor is it
145 Cash, supra note 34, at 128.
146 Id. at 128-29.
147 Id. at 130.148 d
149 See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009).
'
50 Allyson C. Chwee, Note, United States v. Cundif Sixth Circuit Decision Makes
Rapanos v. United States Controversy (Navigable) Water Under A Bridge, 43
CREIGHTON L. REv. 233, 268, 271 (2009).
151 Morrison, supra note 65, 402.
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surprising that what guidance circuit courts have provided has been less
than satisfactory. Indeed, given the realities of the various and seemingly
incompatible opinions expressed in Rapanos, the result reached in
Donovan is pragmatic and logically sound insomuch as it creates a legal
standard which will consistently command a majority of the votes as they
were cast in Rapanos.152 Moreover, the Third Circuit's decision to utilize
both legal standards may have some positive sustainability impacts.153
By allowing use of the Kennedy test to establish jurisdiction, the
Donovan decision will serve to protect and promote biological diversity
and other ecological concerns, 4 which is imperative to maintaining and
improving the overall long-term quality of the environment and is a key
goal in achieving sustainable land use.155 This will occur insomuch as the
Kennedy test requires a holistic evaluation and analysis of both the land to
be developed and the potential impact that such localized development
will have on similarly situated lands.' 56 Unfortunately, Donovan's refusal
to provide guidance regarding similarly situated lands'5 7 gives rise to
problems in that it limits the comprehensive aspect of the Kennedy test
and leaves its ability to affect sustainable land use outcomes uncertain.
Moreover, by adopting both Rapanos tests, the Donovan decision creates a
broad legal standard for determining CWA jurisdiction,'58 which allows
the Corps to continue expansive regulation of wetland areas, as was the
case before the Rapanos decision.l 9
152 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 184 (3d Cir. 2011).
153 Mollerup, supra 57, at 533 (environmentally friendly outcomes produced by
application of the Kennedy test).
154 See Morrison supra note 65, at 410; Mollerup, supra note 57, at 535 (upholding
ecological issues).
155 Klaus Bosselmann, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Environmental Reductionism in
the Law, 2 SUSTAINABILITY 2424, 2429 (2010), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-
1050/2/8/2424/.
156 See Chwee, supra note 150, at 261-64 (discussing the various scientific environmental
factors considered in determining significant nexus).
157 Donovan, 661 F.3d at 187.
1 See Cash, supra note 34, at 129.
159 Id.; see Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (plurality opinion) (discussing
immense expansion of federal regulation of land use).
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While expansive environmental regulation and protection may
seem like a positive in the eyes of sustainability proponents, such is not
necessarily the case. A key aspect of sustainability is the idea that laws
should "protect and restore the environment at the same time as they help
grow the economy, create jobs, and protect national security." 60 Faced
with the cost-prohibitive permitting process required by the CWA,161
developers may seek opportunities elsewhere. This raises several
concerns. First, it has the potential to deprive impoverished communities
in wetland areas - such as exist in much of the southeastern United
States1 62 - of much needed economic development and job opportunities.
Denial of such opportunities raises issues as to social justice and
sustainability, particularly if lower permitting costs would have allowed
the development to go forward in a manner consistent with sustainable
land use principles. In short, it is socially unjust to deprive a community
of development opportunities to protect a wetlands area when preservation
of that wetlands area is, according to scientific data, not essential for
achieving the environmental aspects of sustainable land use.163
Furthermore, if developers choose to pursue alternative sites for
development in order to avoid the costs and delay inherent to developing
in a wetlands area,'6 the development may end up going forward in a
different area where more damage to the environment is done than would
have occurred had the development gone forward on the initial wetland
site. In other cases, the development may be abandoned all together, thus
160 John C. Dernbach, The Essential and Growing Role ofLegal Education in Achieving
Sustainability, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489, 502 (2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1471344.
161 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (discussing the delays and substantial costs involved with
permitting under the CWA); see Stephen Louthan & Steve Dougherty, EPA and Corps
Guidance on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 37 COLO. LAW. 39, 43 (2008)(projects
involving wetlands will likely encounter increased costs and delays after Rapanos).
162 See generally, Ronald C. Wimberley & Libby V. Morris, U.S. Poverty Over Space
and Time: Its Persistence in the South, 1 SOCIATION TODAY 2 (2003), available at
http://www.ncsociology.org/sociationtoday/v2/wimmor.htm.
163 Dernbach, surpa note 160, at 502 (integration of environmental and development
goals).
'6 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (discussing delays and costs involved with permitting); see
Louthan, supra note 161, at 43.
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depriving society of the benefits that flow from development.16 The
better result would be for the development to go forward, but under
restrictions that reflect a sustainable outlook and using sustainable
development practices.' 66 However, courts are not capable of effectively
or efficiently achieving these sustainable goals on their own.1 Indeed,
the most effective strategy for the development of sustainable practices
must start with those in charge of making and implementing the laws. 68
That being the case, it is clear the Corps failed to capitalize on an
opportunity to advance a sustainable agenda when it scrapped its post-
SWANCC rule-making process and failed to modify the existing
interpretations with an eye towards sustainable land use. 169 Furthermore,
the fractured nature of the Rapanos decision undermined any chance that
it would produce sustainably beneficial change in the regulatory
interpretation of CWA jurisdiction.170 These problems have been
exacerbated by circuit court decisions like Donovan, which, by adopting
both Rapanos standards, continue to provide the Corps with broad
jurisdictional authority to regulate wetland areas under the CWA.' 7 ' The
165 See Dembach, supra note 16060, at 502. Sustainably tailored laws will "protect and
restore the environment at the same time as they help grow the economy, create jobs, and
protect national security." Id.
166 See generally Anthony B. Schutz, Grassland Governance and Common-Interest
Communities, 2 SUSTAINABILITY 2320, 2323 (2010) (link between conservation and rural
development), available at http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/2/7/2320/.
167 John C. Dernbach & Joel A. Mintz, Environmental Laws and Sustainability: An
Introduction, 3 SUSTAINABILITY 531, 537 (2011) (nature of sustainability makes it
impossible to confine to one agency or department), available at
http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/3/3/531/ [hereinafter Dernbach & Mintz].
168 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Gary E. Marchant, Institutionalizing
Sustainability Across the Federal Government, 2 SUSTAINABILITY 1924 (2010)
(discussing mechanisms for institutionalizing sustainable policies through the
modification of preexisting laws, and or the use of various tools and strategies available
to members of the legislature and executive branch), available at
http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/2/7/1924/.
'
6 9 Dembach & Mintz, supra note 167, at 534 (achieving sustainability across the federal
government is achievable by modifying, strengthening, or extending existing laws).
170 Morrison, supra note 65, at 410 (critics calling post-Rapanos regulations
unnecessarily over and under inclusive)
171 See Cash, supra note 34, at 129.
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result of that broad jurisdiction is that developers will continue to face
significant deterrents to development in wetland areas in the form of
added costs and delays created by CWA permitting. This, in turn,
potentially deprives impoverished wetland communities of the economic
benefits such development creates.
Moreover, the Third Circuit expressly declined to provide critical
guidance regarding the specifics of what constitutes similarly situated
lands under the Kennedy test.172 This leaves district courts without
guidance regarding a critical aspect of the legal standard established by the
decision. In this way, the Third Circuit is little better than the Supreme
Court, as Donovan does nothing to eliminate the ambiguity and
uncertainty contained in the Kennedy test.173 The consequences of that
failure are felt broadly; without clear consistent legal standards not only
are the lower courts left adrift, 174 but the public faces the prospect of
expensive litigation, risking an uncertain outcome anytime there is a
question regarding jurisdiction under the CWA.175 Faced with those risks,
businesses are more likely to delay development and construction projects
while seeking a Corps permit. Such delays along with the permitting
expenses drive up costs and serve as disincentives to development. 176
These increased costs may prevent some developers from using higher
172Id. at 187.
173 See Morrison, supra note 65, at 405; Mollerup, supra note 57, at 534 (Kennedy's
opinion in Rapanos provided little guidance as to the practical application of his test);
Springer, supra note 138, at 90-91 (case-by-case application of Rapanos tests causes
uncertainty and inconsistency).
174 Morrison, supra note 65, at 407-409.
175 Id. at 405; see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 719 (2006) (discussing the
costs of federal permitting and the risks of failing to obtain a permit).
'
7 6 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (discussing delays and costs involved with permitting); see
Lakshmi Lakshmanan, Note, The Supreme Court Wades Through the Clean Water Act to
Determine What Constitutes the "Waters of the United States", 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 371, 391-92 (2007)("An increase in the cost to develop land including
building homes and industrial and commercial buildings could potentially lead to less
development and growth of our economy. Thus, if the Corps' jurisdiction over the
"waters of the United States" is expanded, this could have a stifling affect on the growth
of our cities and towns.")
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priced sustainable materials in an attempt to cut costs and minimize
expenses.
It is also significant that the Donovan court relied so heavily on the
expert reports provided by the United States, and that it granted summary
judgment because Donovan failed to provide any countervailing expert
evidence. 7 7 These facts suggest that citizens challenging Corpsjurisdiction under the CWA must now hire and pay for expensive
scientific experts to provide rebuttal evidence.' 7 8 This will only add to the
expense involved with the federal permitting process under the CWA, and
thus acts as a further disincentive to development.
It seems the best result, in terms of sustainable land use vis-a'-vis
wetlands, would have been adoption of the Kennedy test alone. This
would have been slightly more restrictive of Corps jurisdiction, thereby
reducing some of the permitting costs and delays and, in turn, promoting
development.179 However, the holistic nature of the assessment under the
Kennedy test would also ensure that those barriers to development would
only be lowered in cases where the wetland to be developed has little
ecological or environmental impact on the larger ecosystem.180 In short,
the Third Circuit should have adopted the Kennedy test as the controlling
legal standard. In so doing, the Donovan court would have established a
test that would reduce the barriers inherent to the CWA permitting process
while still protecting the environment, thereby achieving a sustainable
balance between development and environmental protection.
Furthermore, adoption of the Kennedy test alone would have been in
accord with the restrictive intent expressed by the Supreme Court majority
in Rapanos.
177 United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 187 (3d Cir. 2011).
178 Smith, supra note 60, at 370-72.
179 Morrison, supra note 65, at 405.
1so See Mollerup, supra note 57, 537-38 (the Kennedy test is a compromise between
environmental advocates and land owners); see also Lakshmi, supra note 178, at 391-92
(the potential for higher housing costs and less economic development due to CWA
permitting must be compared to the impacts on aquatic lands).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Achieving sustainability will be a gradual process; thus, the
regulatory agencies in charge of enforcing and interpreting environmental
laws should do so erring on the side of achieving a sustainable balance
rather than extreme environmental protection or unchecked
development.' 8 ' The courts, as interpreters of the law, will be at the heart
of this process. Indeed, Donovan illustrates how imperative it is for the
judiciary to consider the sustainability implications of its decisions as they
review agency interpretations of laws, particularly environmental laws.
With an eye towards sustainable outcomes and long-term impacts, the
courts can play an important role in achieving a more sustainable future.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit's decision in Donovan leaves
much to be desired. Because it validates both Rapanos tests, Donovan
does little if anything to reduce the barriers to sustainable land use created
by broad Corps jurisdiction under the CWA. Moreover, Donovan
exacerbates those cost barriers by requiring expensive expert testimony in
order to prevail at summary judgment when challenging Corps jurisdiction
under the CWA. Additionally, the Third Circuit failed to provide any
guidance regarding similarly situated lands under the Kennedy test leaving
the lower courts to make those determinations on an ambiguous and
unpredictable case-by-case basis. That being said, use of the Kennedy test
seems likely to have ecological benefits important to achieving long-term
environmental sustainability because it achieves a balance between
building development and environmental protection. However,
Donovan's adoption of both Rapanos tests raises the unsettling possibility
that circuit courts may begin to flout and defy the express intent
communicated in a Supreme Court decision when that decision is a
fractured plurality. Had the Third Circuit instead limited the legal
standard to the Kennedy test, it would have achieved both fidelity to the
intent of the Supreme Court and maximized the goals of sustainability.
181 See Dernbach & Mintz, supra note 167, at 532 ("The central action principle of
sustainable development is integrated decision-making - the incorporation of
environmental, social, and economic considerations and goals into decisions.").
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Instead, by validating both Rapanos tests, Donovan sustained the
jurisdictional quagmire.
RYAN J. NIEHAUS
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